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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE FOR APPEAL 
Appellee Fraternal Order of Eagles ("FOE") argues that Plaintiff failed to preserve the 
issue regarding application of the 1999 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to this case. However, 
Plaintiff expressly pointed out to the trial court that the pre-amended 1999 rules applied. (R. at 
620). Moreover, FOE themselves previously argued that the 1999 Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
applied to this case. (R. 306). Indeed, in analyzing whether to grant a new trial, the trial court 
itself applied the 1998 rules. "The court finds that the defense had no obligation under the 1998 
version of Rule 26 to furnish plaintiff with a written report by Mr. Capehart" (R. at 396). 
Plaintiff pointed out that the 1998 Rules applied. FOE themselves argued that the 1998 rules 
applied. The trial court actually applied the 1998 rules to the benefit of FOE. It simply cannot be 
argued that the issue has not been preserved for appeal. 
RESPONSE TO FOE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS 
1. FOE correctly notes that this case was previously tried to a jury. 
2. Although FOE argues that the trial court somehow 'limited' the new trial to the issue of 
expert witness testimony. However, no where did the trial court's original order granting 
the second trial limit the scope of that trial in any way, shape, or form. (R. at 392-401). 
3. At the second trial, Mr. Coxey sought to use still photographs taken from a videotape. 
Many of the electrical outlets at the campground had exposed wires. Prior to the first trial 
in this case, the court entered an order prohibiting plaintiff from displaying photographs 
taken of the campground's poorly maintained electrical outlets. Just before the second 
trial, plaintiffs new counsel obtained a copy of the videotape taken shortly after the 
incident in this case. Because the videotape displayed the area's electrical outlets which 
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the court had previously prohibited plaintiff from displaying, plaintiffs new counsel 
obtained still photographs from the video showing only the area where Mr. Coxey was 
camping. 
4. FOE offers no evidence of prejudice due to the undisclosed videotape. First, FOE can 
still have medical experts review the footage if desired.1 FOE can also prepare a cross 
examination of Mr. Coxey after reviewing the videotape. Third, FOE merely speculates 
that they will be unable to locate the adjacent trailer and its owner. Finally, and as noted 
above, FOE may still question the Coxeys about the videotape and, indeed, might even 
redepose the witnesses as part of preparing for the next trial. FOE raises, at best, 
difficulties associated with a late discovery disclosure, not prejudice to the same degree as 
will be imposed by upholding dismissal of the claims. 
5. Although the trial court may have granted the dismissal on the basis of a willful failure to 
disclose, FOE themselves willfully failed to supplement interrogatories and disclose 
expert testimony prior to the first trial. (R. at 392-395). As a result of the prejudice 
imposed upon the plaintiff, the trial court granted a new trial in order to 'cure' the 
prejudice, but imposing significant costs in terms of time and expense upon the plaintiff. 
1
 Notably, FOE does not assert that: (1) they cannot have the emergency room nurse 
review the tape and offer testimony; or, (2) that the 'deceased caretaker5 would have had 
opportunity even if the videotape were timely disclosed. Accordingly, there is no prejudice 
attaching to either position in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 
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ARGUMENT 
VIDEOTAPES ARE NOT PHOTOGRAPHS AND ANY 
'FAILURE' TO DISCLOSE CANNOT JUSTIFY THE 
EXTREME SANCTION OF DISMISSAL. 
While trial courts have discretion to set sanctions for failure to comply with discovery, 
that discretion should be employed in an equitable and just manner. Here, the trial court first 
allowed defendant to call an expert witness who, despite repeated requests, had never been fully 
disclosed or identified. (R. at 392-395). After recognizing its error, the trial court then granted 
plaintiff a new trial (R. at 402). The trial court could have easily directed verdict for the 
plaintiff as a sanction for defendant's failure to disclose. However the trial court chose the less 
extreme remedy of granting a new trial and thereby alleviating the prejudice imposed by FOE's 
incomplete and inadequate disclosure. 
Unfortunately, when it came time to deal with Mr. Coxey's alleged nondisclosure, the 
trial court chose the extreme sanction of dismissal. Courts must be equitable, fair and just in 
applying their discretion. Here, the court allowed FOE to play lose and fast with the rules 
regarding expert witness disclosures, but only sanctioned such conduct with a 'new trial' at 
considerable expense and prejudice to Mr. Coxey. FOE's interrogatories required disclosure and 
production of photographs of the scene and injuries, not videotape. FOE desires to uphold a rule 
where failure to understand a vague or ambiguous interrogatory results in dismissal of the case. 
By wholly dismissing Mr. Coxey's claim for not disclosing a videotape, a tape which arguably 
did not need to be disclosed, the trial court failed to act with equity in its treatment of the parties. 
The trial court's unfair application of discovery sanctions requires reversal even assuming that 
plaintiff violated a discovery rule or order. 
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A. THE TRIAL COURT OVER-REACHED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DEALING WITH DISCLOSURE OF THE VIDEOTAPE WHERE 
NO DISCOVERY VIOLATION OCCURRED. 
While trial courts enjoy broad discretion in applying sanctions, that discretion is limited 
by the severity of any alleged violation. FOE relies heavily upon Morton v. Continental Baking 
Co.. However, Morton was a split decision, with Justices Stewart and Durham strenuously 
arguing against the majority opinion. At the very least, the dissent should be heeded for the 
following proposition. 
The degree of discretion accorded trial courts varies in proportion to the severity of the 
sanction imposed. It follows that a trial court's range of discretion is more narrow when it 
imposes the ultimate sanction of dismissal than when it imposes less severe sanctions. 
Appellate courts must therefore examine a dismissal or entry of a default judgment with 
much greater care and scrutiny than a lesser sanction. The majority opinion ignores this 
established principle. Although trial courts are afforded due deference in their choice of 
sanctions, an appellate court cannot simply rubber-stamp the decisions of the lower court. 
Morton v. Continental Baking Co., 938 P.2d 271, 280 (Utah 1997)(Stewart, J. dissenting). 
An extreme sanction of dismissal remains unjust, unfair and inappropriate for the simple 
failure to disclose a videotape, especially in the absence of an order compelling production or a 
rule requiring production. In each of the cases cited where dismissal was appropriate, the 
conduct was truly of a persistent and egregious nature. See, e.g., Arnica Mut Ins. Co. v. 
Schettler, 768 P.2d 950, 962 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)("The record in this case clearly demonstrates 
a pattern of aggravated misconduct in the form of willful and deliberate disobedience of 
discovery orders, fabricated testimony, and attempted witness tampering."). 
FOE was allowed to call an expert at the first trial over the objection of Plaintiff s 
counsel. FOE failed to supplement interrogatories specifically requesting information regarding 
that expert. (R. at 392-395). The trial court, exercising discretion, cured the prejudice by 
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By contrast, dismissing for failure to disclose a videotape, where no rule of civil procedure or 
court order mandat i i disclosure, represents an arbitrary and unbalanced application of the trial 
uiurfs discretion Hn (ii.il roiiil\ pnwi In Srin linn "fulls shnil I mm, .ison.ihli' .mil ailiilMi ' 
action... which will result in injustice." Westinghouse Elec, Supply Co, v. Paul W. Larsen 
claimed prejudice existed. The "trial court could easily have- excluded the evidence Th I rial 
court could easily have reset, trial and given FOE opportunity to investigate based upon the 
ti ial cannot be considered as equitable 01 fail A hei e 
ihe tnal court did n* >i applv a similar sanction to the more direct violatioii of discovery rules by 
FOE for failing to answer a specific interrogatory requesting information on their experts, 
A. • i- ?7 FAILS TO SITPPOU* i ||Mi ^VIMI 'THIN ii niSMIS^^I 
•\ M l l s r ^ S F 
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to this cas* % J i)f» ii 111 n liii.ll fin lliii'iii fiiiliiii In tOppli'ini'iil iiifcuo^aN "..- • ri 
r * .i.rd ilia! the I y1*1* rules applied... Further, Appellant specifi.ca.Hy argued, that application... of 
; .-^ -; . ,.. .. amendments u , ,*.v ~t, i^mnu^ ihciii *• iu..ii% 1 
an expert report; did not apply to this case because it was filed in 1998." (R. at 395). "Defendant 
was never obligated to provide an expert witness report, because the rale requiring such reports is 
i :J** ;hai anything other than, the pre-1999 amended rules applk-d i^ this case where they 
.:_ Jit that those rules applied. Finally, the trial cu r t ilscll h-unu "that the defense 
5 
had no obligation under the 1998 version of Rule 26 to furnish plaintiff with a written report by 
Mr. Capehart." (R. at 396). Clearly, the pre-amendment rules control in this case, FOE's 
argument to the contrary notwithstanding. 
FOE claims that the trial court may dismiss the case as a sanction for an evasive or 
incomplete answer to an interrogatory. (Appellee's Brief at p. 13). FOE fails to point out how 
non-disclosure of a videotape is either evasive or incomplete. FOE failed to ask about the 
existence of any video footage during the depositions of Mr. and Mrs. Coxey. FOE cannot 
support the severe sanction of dismissal through their own failures to conduct effective 
discovery. FOE themselves failed to answer discovery directed specifically at whether an expert 
would testify, the testimony of that expert, his qualifications. (R. 392-395). Based upon FOE's 
argument, there should not have been a new trial for such direct refusal to participate in 
discovery, but rather a directed verdict. 
The failure to disclose a videotape, when the discovery requests photographs, does not 
constitute the type of flagrant discovery violation warranting the sanction of dismissal. 
Importantly, none of the authorities cited by FOE actually upheld dismissal based upon an 
alleged discovery failure without contemporaneous violation of a court order. See, e.g., Morton, 
938 P.2d at 273 ("the court made it clear that Morton had until 5:00 o'clock p.m. on the tenth day 
from the signing of the order to comply... Morton did not respond in any way to either the notice 
to submit or the court's order."); Hales v. Oldroyd, 999 P.2d 588, 592 (Utah App.,2000)(the trial 
court clearly relied in part on Hales's failure to comply with a court order under Rule 37(b)(2)(C) 
in dismissing her claim.); Preston & Chambers, P.C. v. Roller, 943 P.2d 260, 262 -263 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1997)("because the trial court issued an order imposing a discovery deadline, which 
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Iv'tlln (Vili'tl In im «, I, 'h' dit'LsiL'ii lu sanction kullci by dismissing his counterclaims is within, 
the court's discretion.'"). Dismissal of Mr. Coxey's case imposes the harshest of sanctions fc r a 
questionable discovery violation and cannot be upheld as action within the trial court's 
d i s u ' d i u n . • .- • :.. • ' • • ' • '• 
I NEITHER RULE 41(b) NOR RULE 60(b)(6) SUPPORT DISMISSAL 
OF MR. COXEY'S CLAIMS. 
VOV assf *L
 r : . .. ... , ...**. court dismissed his 
case by relying solch or. I Mah Rnl** of Civil Procedure 37/" j Moliec"s lirief at p I 11 I li 
not a 'false impress, <i ^ -^ u- i Nowhere dors the trial court cite, suggest or rely upon any 
rule other than Rule / ' • 
However, even il Rules 4 v o0 were relied upon, they cannot support the dismissal with 
, .. ,., .wi Ji;„iiK,,», winv where the plaintiff fails "to 
prosecute or to comply with these rules or any order of coun * . *' * 
..u.-. .n^u jXiiiited out, there was no violation of a court order in this case Vddilionallw \npellant 
con- ""• ' • gauoiicxi^icu to disciose 
the videotape, absent an intern-;.- . -;. or request directed alproduction ol videotape. Broadly 
reading photograph to mean videotape, where ""the opposing party used both terms in separate 
interrogatories, places the partv orronent in t! ~ • • •%1 *\> 
been sketches made, would mese also count us "photographs?* It there lun. been a recorded vo?ce 
description c f the area, nt)|._ t^ .* ii;>ti- IUK , 1 * M * -i.^  
each term, videotape and photograph, advisedly. (R. at 923-924). Mr. Coxey should n. • • • 
sanctioned by dismissal for responding only to the question, posed by FOE. At most, there exists 
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a technical violation of discovery procedure insufficient to sustain the exceptional sanction of 
dismissal. 
Rule 60(b) cannot be employed to undo the grant of a new trial. In Drury v. Lunceford, 
18 Utah 2d 74, 76-77, 415 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 1966) the Utah Supreme Court refused to uphold 
the trial court's decision to set aside, under Rule 60(b), the grant of a new trial. 
when the trial court has made his decision granting the new trial, that has the effect of 
vacating the judgment and the case reverts to its status before the trial was had. The party 
favored by the motion acquires an important right in his entitlement to a new trial, which 
he should not be arbitrarily deprived of, nor should he be subject to the possible whim or 
caprice of the judge as to whether he can really have the new trial which has been ordered 
or not. 
Id 
Here, the trial court found that, by allowing FOE's expert to testify, it so prejudiced the 
case against Mr. Coxey that a new trial was warranted. The case returned, at that point, to a 
pretrial status as if the claims were never tried. Rule 60(b) also affords no excuse to deprive Mr. 
Coxey of his right to a new trial and cannot form the basis upon which to affirm the trial court's 
inappropriate sanction of dismissal. 
D. DISMISSAL REMAINS AN INAPPROPRIATE SANCTION FOR 
NOT FAILING TO READ 'PHOTOGRAPH' TO REQUIRE 
PRODUCTION OF VIDEOTAPE. 
The failure to understand that FOE intended to include videotape within the term 
'photograph' cannot sustain an extreme sanction of dismissal. FOE used the term videotape in a 
separate interrogatory directed to interviews. FOE themselves stand guilty of a far more flagrant 
disregard for the discovery process. They initially responded to interrogatories directed 
specifically at expert witnesses with only the vague 'may be called.' FOE never supplemented 
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any of the requested information, despite the fact that the discovery went specifically to expert 
witnesses. FOE then called an expert they identified only as a 'consultant.' FOE never identified 
the expert as one who would testify at trial. FOE never answered the interrogatory requesting a 
brief description of the expert's testimony. FOE directly and wilfully refused to comply with 
specific interrogatories directed at specific issues. FOE's claim that plaintiffs conduct was 
'egregious' fails when compared to their own discovery misconduct. Rather than direct a verdict 
for Plaintiff, the trial court began the process anew. Equity and fairness demand that Plaintiff be 
accorded the same treatment for a far less culpable, and more understandable violation. 
Nor do any of the factors cited by the trial court support dismissal. There is no finding 
that the 'deceased caretaker' would have had opportunity to review the videotape, even if it had 
been timely disclosed. Moreover, the 'unavailability' of an out-of-state nurse is nothing more 
than speculation. Finally, there is no finding that the camper depicted in the video, or its owners, 
cannot be located. 
The cases cited by FOE contain truly unconscionable discovery misconduct, not mere 
failure to understand the breadth of information sought by the term 'photograph.' In Marshall v. 
Marshall, 915 P.2d 508, 515 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) the offender "secreted approximately 
$180,000 of his income... never presented the statements evidencing payment of [] obligations in 
compliance with the May 27,1994 discovery order... failed to reveal several savings and 
investment accounts he held with Prudential and failed to comply with the trial court's discovery 
order by providing documentation of these accounts." In Hill v. Dicker son, 839 P.2d 309 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) the offending party received a continuance, then on the eve of trial named six new 
fact witnesses, along with a previously undisclosed expert witness. In Schoney v. Memorial 
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Estates, Inc., 790 P.2d 584 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) the party filed five amended complaints, failed 
to timely provide discovery, and directly violated "an order fixing a cut-off date for discovery." 
Id. at 586. In Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah 1964) the defendant first 
claimed that he had records available, then refused to produce them, then argued that the records 
did not exist. The court found "the vagaries of defendant's changing positions" and 
unwillingness to comply with ordered production supported dismissal. 
The conduct in each of the cases cited by FOE clearly eclipses the failure, if any, of Mr. 
Coxey in this case. Failing to produce a videotape in response to discovery requesting 
photographs simply does not rise to the sanctionable level of dismissal. 
NO LIMIT ON THE SCOPE OF THE NEW TRIAL MAY BE 
IMPOSED 
FOE does not cite a single authority to counter that the grant of a new trial resets the 
party's positions as if the first trial never occurred. Utah law clearly demands that the scope of 
the new trial not be limited. See, Hyland v. St. Mark's Hospital, All P.2d 736 (Utah 1967); 
Haslam v. Paulsen, 389 P.2d 736 (Utah 1964); and, Klinge v. Southern Pacific Co, 57 P.2d 367 
(Utah 1936). FOE cites nothing in the trial court's Order granting a new trial which limits the 
scope. Absent an express limitation in that Order, and absent some compelling reason to depart 
from the relevant case authority, there can be limits on the scope of evidence and witnesses 
produced at the new trial. By limiting the scope of the new trial to that of the previous trial, the 
court may as well read a transcript of the first trial to the jury and allow presentation of expert 
witness testimony from plaintiff to rebut the improper testimony of FOE's undisclosed expert. 
10 
CONCLUSION 
FOE cites no authority directly supporting the dismissal of a case for discovery 
misconduct without a contemporaneous non-compliance with a direct court order. The sanction 
of dismissal remains inappropriate given that no court order was violated. Additionally, the trial 
court erred in imposing the extreme sanction of dismissal to, at best, a technical violation of 
discovery rules. The trial court ignored equity in applying remedies for any supposed violation. 
FOE failed to respond to direct and specific discovery requests. FOE's conduct prejudiced Mr. 
Coxey to the degree that the trial court granted a new trial, in an attempt to remedy the prejudice 
imposed by FOE's misconduct. Mr. Coxey merely failed to provide a videotape in response to 
discovery requesting photographs. Equity demands that there be consistency in ruling for each 
party and that Mr. Coxey be given the same latitude for his conduct, a far less obvious discovery 
violation, than that of FOE. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of C^a^^^im. 
£<HJ2f< 
S R. HA&ENYAGER 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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